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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
RICKIE STORM,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45496
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-7503
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rickie Storm requested the district court retain jurisdiction and place him on a “rider” so
he could participate in the new programming options, but the district court refused his request
when it imposed his sentence for felony forgery. The district court also denied Mr. Storm’s
subsequent Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion for a reduction of sentence. On appeal,
Mr. Storm asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence.
Mr. Storm also asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion,
in view of the new and additional information presented on his desire to make a positive
transition from prison to society.
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In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Storm did not establish the district court
abused its sentencing discretion, or that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion. (See Resp. Br., pp.2-5.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify the facts related to some of the statements made
by the State. Additionally, this brief is necessary because the State did not squarely address the
district court’s failure to adequately consider Mr. Storm’s mental condition. Further, this brief is
necessary to counter the State’s contention that Mr. Storm did not provide a basis for this Court
to find that the denial of his Rule 35 motion was an abuse of discretion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Storm’s Appellant’s Brief, and are incorporated herein by reference thereto. A few points of
factual clarification are below.
In the Respondent’s Brief, the State wrote, “[a]t the time he committed the offense in this
case, [Mr.] Storm reported not knowing what he was doing for over a month because he relapsed
on methamphetamine and cocaine.”

(Resp. Br., p.4.)

However, while an officer stated

Mr. Storm reported he relapsed on methamphetamine and cocaine (see PSI, pp.4, 51), in the
presentence investigation Mr. Storm stated he relapsed on methamphetamine and did not
mention relapsing on cocaine (see PSI, pp.25-26). In an interview to screen for substance use
and mental disorders, Mr. Storm reported he last used cocaine in 1990. (See PSI, p.33.)
The State also wrote that Mr. Storm “has participated in a number of substance abuse
treatment programs but has been unable to abstain from drug use, except while incarcerated.”
(Resp. Br., p.4 (citing PSI, pp.396-401).) Mr. Storm’s mental health evaluation, which the State
cited, stated he reported receiving “in custody treatment including 40 hour substance abuse class,
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relapse prevention, and many others,” including “White Bison and CSC levels I-III.” (PSI,
p.396.) Mr. Storm also reported spending “45 days in RSAT at ‘the farm.’” (PSI, p.396.) He
stated he had not received treatment in the community. (PSI, pp.396-97.) However, Mr. Storm
completed some of those programs, such as “Cognitive Self Change (Phase I, II, III),” between
1997 and 2002. (See PSI, p.176.) Additionally, Mr. Storm reported his “longest period of
sobriety being from 1991 through 1996” (see PSI, p.26), and the record indicates he spent at least
a year of that period on parole, not in prison (see PSI, p.169).
Further, the State wrote, based on a statement by one of Mr. Storm’s parole officers, that
Mr. Storm “has demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to conform his behavior to the
requirements of the law.”

(See Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)

However, at the sentencing hearing,

Mr. Storm’s counsel told the district court Mr. Storm objected to a lot of the parole officer’s
characterizations. (See Tr., p.23, Ls.5-6.) Counsel explained that although Mr. Storm “does not
deny that he was using methamphetamine, he does deny he was hanging out at drug houses and
had anything to do with any firearms.” (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-13.) Counsel thought Mr. Storm “drove
someone home and that Mr. Storm was nowhere near the residence when that occurred and he
did not know what was inside of the residence.” (Tr., p.23, Ls.14-17.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed, upon Mr. Storm following his plea of guilty to felony forgery?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Storm’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence, in view of the new and additional
information presented on his desire to make a positive transition from prison to society?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Storm Following His Plea Of Guilty To Felony Forgery
Mr. Storm asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, because his sentence is excessive considering any
view of the facts. The district court should have instead followed Mr. Storm’s recommendation
by retaining jurisdiction, so Mr. Storm could participate in the new programming options on
a rider.
The State argues Mr. Storm’s sentence is “appropriate in light of his extensive criminal
history and his failure to rehabilitate while in the community.” (Resp. Br., p.3.) The State, while
acknowledging Mr. Storm “undoubtedly has some mental health issues,” contends “those issues
are exacerbated when he uses illegal drugs rather than prescription medication.” (See Resp.
Br., p.4.) But this argument by the State does not squarely address the district court’s failure to
adequately consider Mr. Storm’s mental condition.

Mr. Storm’s mental health evaluation

recommended he “engage in II.V Partial Hospitalization substance use treatment, substitute II.I
IOP [Intensive Outpatient Program] substance use treatment due to lack of available services and
mental health treatment. Client is recommended to subsequently step down in level of care.”
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(PSI, p.402.) In other words, the evaluation recommended Mr. Storm participate in treatment in
the community, as opposed to in prison. (See PSI, p.402.)
During the sentencing hearing, the district court told Mr. Storm, “[y]ou have the
resources, you have the tools that you need to know how to stay sober, but you have to execute
on those.” (Tr., p.28, Ls.13-15.) However, the mental health evaluation indicated Mr. Storm
would instead need intensive treatment in the community to effectively deal with his substance
abuse and mental health issues. (See PSI, p.402.) Further, as Mr. Storm suggested during the
sentencing hearing, because of the long periods of incarceration in his life, he lacked other tools
such as job skills and training. (See Tr., p.24, L.7 – p.25, L.2.)
In sum, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Storm’s mental condition, nor
did it adequately consider his desire to circumvent the vicious cycle of incarceration. If the
district court had adequately considered those factors, it would have concluded that placing
Mr. Storm on a rider, as opposed to more prison time, would have empowered him to improve
his mental health and begin building the skills necessary to live in society. Thus, the district
court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Storm’s unified sentence, because his sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Storm’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence, In View Of The New And Additional Information
Presented On His Desire To Make A Positive Transition From Prison To Society
Mr. Storm asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, in view of the new and additional
information presented on his desire to make a positive transition from prison to society.
The State argues, “[a]s found by the district court in its order denying [Mr.] Storm’s
Rule 35 motion, [Mr.] Storm’s desire to make a positive transition from prison to society . . . is
not new information that entitled him to a reduction of sentence.”

(Resp. Br., p.5

(citation omitted).)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman,
144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a
vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Id.
Mr. Storm asserts that, even assuming (without conceding) he did not provide any new
information in support of his Rule 35 motion, he nonetheless has provided a basis for this Court
to find that the denial of his Rule 35 motion was an abuse of discretion. At the least, the
information presented in support of the Rule 35 motion on Mr. Storm’s desire to make a positive
transition from prison to society (see generally Addendum to Defendant’s Motion Pursuant to
ICR 35, Jan. 4, 2018; Letter from the Defendant, Jan. 17, 2018), was additional information as
contemplated by Huffman.
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Mr. Storm submits the State is incorrect, to the extent it argues that “new information”
serves as the only basis for reversal of the denial of a Rule 35 motion. As discussed above,
“[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of
the Rule 35 motion.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. While the Idaho Supreme Court stated in
Huffman that “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information,” id., the Court has
indicated that additional information also serves as a basis for an appellate court to find that a
denial of a Rule 35 motion was an abuse of discretion.
For example, in State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court, citing
Huffman, stated that, “absent the presentation of new evidence, an appeal from a Rule 35 motion
merely asks this Court to review the underlying sentence. Without additional information being
presented, there is no basis for this Court to find that the denial of the Rule 35 motion was an
abuse of discretion.” Adair, 145 Idaho at 517 (citation omitted). The Adair Court, because “[n]o
additional information was provided to the trial court to indicate that the sentence was
excessive,” decided that “[t]he trial court operated without its discretion when it denied [the
defendant’s] Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.” Id.
Because the Idaho Supreme Court in Huffman and Adair recognized “additional
information” (alongside “new information”) as a way to show that a sentence is excessive in
support of a Rule 35 motion, Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, Adair, 145 Idaho at 517, Mr. Storm
submits that additional information serves as a basis for an appellate court to find that a district
court’s denial of a Rule 35 motion was an abuse of discretion.
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Thus, because Mr. Storm

presented additional information in support of his Rule 35 motion, he has provided a basis for
this Court to find that the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion.
Mr. Storm further submits the district court abused its discretion when it denied the
Rule 35 motion, in view of the new and additional information presented on his desire to make a
positive transition from prison to society. (See App. Br., pp.10-13.) The State argues, “[t]hat
[Mr.] Storm is not currently eligible for the specific rehabilitative programs in which he would
like to participate also fails to show an abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for
leniency. . . . [T]he ‘alleged deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is an issue more properly
framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act.’” (Resp. Br., p.5 (quoting State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520 (Ct. App.
1989).)
However, Mr. Storm recognized he could not be placed in a community reentry center
under IDOC policy because of a prior sex offense. (See Letter from the Defendant, p.2.) Despite
Mr. Storm’s desire to make a positive transition from prison to society, that IDOC policy left him
unable to develop job skills and employment stability. (See Letter from the Defendant, pp.2-3.)
Instead of keeping him in prison, which would leave him even further behind, Mr. Storm’s
suggestion that he could participate in a rider and then go into an Ada County Jail work release
program (see Letter from the Defendant, p.2), would empower him to begin building the skills
necessary to live in society. The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Storm’s
Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Storm respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2018.

_________/s/________________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of April, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in
the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
RICKIE STORM
INMATE #17849
ISCI
PO BOX 14
BOISE ID 83707
STEVEN J HIPPLER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
TERI K JONES
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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